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Abstract
We find that presidential and congressional influences affect the rate of disaster
declaration and the allocation of FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
disaster expenditures across states.  States politically important to the president have
a higher rate of disaster declaration by the president, and disaster  expenditures are
higher in states having congressional representation on FEMA oversight committees.
Election year impacts are also found.  Our models predict that nearly half of all
disaster relief is motivated politically rather than by need.  The findings reject a purely
altruistic model of FEMA assistance and question the relative effectiveness of
government versus private disaster relief.
The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments
Thomas A. Garrett
Research Division
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis




Morgantown, West Virginia 265061
“Disasters are very political events.”  - Former FEMA Director James Lee Witt
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I. INTRODUCTION
A central contribution of public choice theory to the analysis of government activity is in
viewing the activities of government, not as determined by some single altruistic dictator, but
rather as the result of a process involving individual political agents who react to the incentives
they face.  This somewhat skeptical view of government provided by the public choice approach
can be hard for many people to accept, particularly those who believe that in many important
cases such as regulation, income redistribution, tax collection, and general government spending
for the “public good” that the government acts to maximize public welfare; and that individuals in
political power will put aside their personal self-interests in favor of the public good.  In these
cases then, where people would imagine the government acting benevolently, it is most important
to test the predictions of the public choice model.
Tests of the public choice model to various cases of government activity have their basis in
what has been called the congressional dominance model, which postulates that bureaus are very
responsive to the wishes of congress.  As discussed by Moe (1987, 1997), Weingast and Moran
(1983), and Weingast (1984), the model suggests that congressional committees having both
budget and oversight responsibilities see that bureaucrats implement the policy preferences of the
legislators (legislators are wealth maximizers); and that the executive branch behaves as an
electoral vote maximizer.  There have been several empirical tests of various forms of the
congressional dominance model.  Wright (1974), Anderson and Tollison (1991), and Couch and
Shughart (1997) find that New Deal spending across states was correlated with congressional2
power and the importance of a state’s electoral votes in the next presidential election.  In a study
of Federal Reserve policy, Grier (1987) finds that Fed policy is influenced by changes in the
leadership of the Senate Banking Committee.  Faith, Leavens, and Tollison (1982) show that
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) case rulings tend to be more favorable for firms with
headquarters in a district having representation on FTC congressional oversight committees.
Finally, Young, Reksulak, and Shughart (2001) present strong evidence that Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) audit rates are substantially lower in states that are politically important in the next
presidential election, and are also substantially lower in the congressional districts of members on
key congressional committees overseeing the IRS. 
Here we examine whether congressional and presidential influences affect the rate of
disaster declaration and the allocation of federal disaster relief payments made by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
2   This paper has several distinct advantages over
earlier works on congressional dominance, afforded by the unique nature of disaster declaration
and relief.  The potential exists for political influence to impact the process at two distinct stages;
whether or not a disaster is declared, and then how much money is allocated for the disaster. 
After a disaster strikes a particular area, the governor makes a request to the president for disaster
assistance.  After receiving a governor’s request, the president then decides whether or not to
declare the state or region a disaster area.  Only after a disaster has been declared by the president
can disaster relief be given.  FEMA is in charge of determining the level of relief funding for the
area, but further appropriations are determined by Congress in cases requiring large amounts of
funding beyond FEMA’s allocated budget. 3
FEMA was created by an executive order of President Carter in 1979 that essentially
merged together many separate disaster relief agencies that had already been in existence.  FEMA
is responsible for allocating federal money to areas that have been adversely impacted by natural
disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, fires, and severe flooding.  However, a great
deal of FEMA funding is also allocated for more minor weather phenomenon such as 
thunderstorms, snow storms, and ice storms.  FEMA disaster relief is based on the idea that
federal aid is necessary to supplement state and local relief. On average, FEMA provides annual
relief expenditures of about $3 billion for about 50 declared disasters each year.  Relief varies
greatly from year to year, however, and hit a high in 1994 when FEMA disaster expenditures
exceeded $8 billion.
The vast majority of FEMA operations and expenditures are undertaken under the rules
and processes established by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (Public Law 93-288), hereafter referred to as the Stafford Act.  This act establishes the
process for requesting a Presidential disaster declaration, defines the types of relief that are
available for relief expenditures, and also the conditions for obtaining assistance.  From a
budgetary standpoint, expenditures under the Stafford Act come from the portion of FEMA’s
budget known as the President’s Disaster Relief Fund.  In addition to FEMA’s activities under the
Stafford Act, there are several additional, smaller programs undertaken outside the Stafford Act
such as the flood insurance program and the U.S. Fire Administration. 
The activities of FEMA are subject to congressional oversight by several committees.  In
the House of Representatives, for example, there are four committees partially responsible for the
oversight of FEMA.  Two of these committees oversee the activities of FEMA under the Stafford4
Act, while the other two oversee the smaller, non-Stafford Act activities.  A similar process is
present on the Senate side of FEMA congressional oversight.
Sources of Political Influence
The process for FEMA disaster relief suggests there are two potential sources by which
political influence may enter into the FEMA disaster relief process, both of which we test
empirically.  The first avenue of political influence is in the process of disaster declaration. 
Disaster declaration is solely in the hands of the president.  The Stafford Act also provides the
president no concrete set of criteria on which to declare a disaster.  Given that disaster declaration
is a decision left entirely to the president, and because there is such a wide range of possible
weather phenomenon for which disasters may be declared, it is possible that he may be more likely
to declare a disaster in a state that is politically important.  Also, because the Stafford Act allows
the president to unilaterally declare a disaster without the approval of congress, it is possible that
the president may use this power to punish or reward legislators who support or oppose his
policies, or just simply tarnish the image of opposing party legislators in hopes of reducing their
probability of reelection.  
The potential for presidential political manipulation is in part due to the wording of the
Stafford Act, which was made more general in 1988.  Federal assistance under the Stafford act
should be awarded when the incident "is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is
beyond the capabilities of the state and the affected local governments and that federal assistance
is necessary."  The vague language of what constitutes a disaster means that an official federal
disaster could have occurred whenever the president said it did.  In fact, before the Stafford Act5
was modified in 1988, the average number of disasters a year between 1983 and 1988 was 25. 
Between 1989 and 1994, the average number of disasters a year increased to 41.
The second avenue of political influence may occur through congressional oversight.  This
is spurred by the important fact that the Stafford Act specifically prohibits the use of any
arithmetic formula to determine disaster relief to any geographic area.  In other words, there are
no set criteria on which levels of FEMA disaster expenditures are based.  It is important for the
agency to be in good standing with the oversight committees, as these committees can have
considerable influence over the agency.  In 1992, for example, the House Appropriations
Committee found evidence of excessive and wasteful spending by several senior executives at
FEMA, such as chauffeur-driven cars.  The Appropriations Committee readily cut several
executive positions and reduced the budgets of others.
3  Given the power of oversight
committees, it is thus possible that states that are represented on these committees overseeing
FEMA receive a disproportionately larger amount of money for disaster relief to remain in the
good graces of the oversight committees.  
II.  DATA DESCRIPTION
This section provides an overview of several key variables we use in our empirical tests of
political influence on disaster declaration and expenditures.
FEMA Disaster Expenditures
FEMA disaster expenditures were obtained for all 50 states over the period 1991 to 1999. 
These include expenditures on all declared disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, snowstorms,6
hurricanes, tornados, etc.  The expenditure data are censored in that not every state in a given
year had a disaster declared, so some observations take the value of zero.
4    An examination of
the raw data reveals that some states received significantly higher disaster relief than other states
over the nine year sample period.  The top ten and bottom ten states in terms of disaster relief
received (1996 dollars) are shown in Table 1.  Not surprising is the finding that the bigger, more
populated states like California, Florida, and Texas received significantly more funding, as these
states along with several others in the top ten are subject to relatively common disasters such as
earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, and tornados.  
The raw data also allows an interesting examination of recent major disasters and the level
of relief received.  Many Midwestern and southern states bordering the Mississippi river had
significantly higher FEMA disaster relief in 1993 than in other years due to the massive floods that
year.  In 1992, the year of hurricane Andrew, Florida received $1.86 billion in FEMA disaster
expenditures, or roughly 72% of Florida’s total disaster expenditures received over the sample
period.  Similarly, of California’s $8.87 billion in disaster relief over the sample period, $7.24
billion was received in 1994, the year of the Northridge earthquake.  
FEMA Oversight Subcommittees
Are disaster expenditure levels solely a result of the natural occurrence and size of the
disaster, or does congressional influence also determine disaster expenditure levels? To explore
whether those states having greater representation on FEMA oversight committees receive higher
FEMA disaster expenditures, we researched which House and Senate subcommittees have FEMA
oversight responsibilities, and how many legislators from each state for a given year serve on each7
oversight subcommittee.  This information was obtained from the Almanac of American Politics
over various years and was confirmed by FEMA. 
There are a total of nine subcommittees that oversee FEMA, four in the House of
Representatives and five in the Senate.   Of the four subcommittees in the House, two oversee
major disaster funding (the Stafford Act) and two oversee more minor FEMA programs such as
fire prevention, flood insurance, and earthquake safety programs.  In the
Senate, two subcommittees also oversee disaster expenditures and three oversee other FEMA
programs.  In the House, the two subcommittees that oversee disaster relief under the Stafford
Act are 1) the Water, Resources, and Environment subcommittee of the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, and 2) the Veterans Administration, Housing and Urban Development,
and Independent Agency subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.  In the Senate,
the two Stafford Act oversight subcommittees are 1) the Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property
and Nuclear Safety subcommittee of the Environment and Public Works Committee, and 2) the
Veterans Administration, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agency
subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
The non-Stafford Act oversight committees are, in the House, 1) the Basic Research
subcommittee of the Science Committee, which oversees the U.S. Fire Administration and the
Earthquake program, and 2) the Housing and Community Opportunity subcommittee of the
Banking and Financial Services Committee, which oversees the Flood Insurance Program.  In the
Senate, the three subcommittees are 1) the Oversight of Government Management and District of
Columbia subcommittee of the Government Affairs Committee, 2) the Housing Opportunity and
Community Development subcommittee of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee,8
and 3) the Science, Technology, and Space subcommittee of the Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee.
The number of members on each of the nine subcommittees is relatively constant over the
years, although membership can vary.  A listing of each subcommittee and the average number of
members on each committee over the period 1991 through 1999 is provided in Table 2.  In
addition, membership is not uniform across the states - some states may have more than one
legislator on an oversight subcommittee, whereas other states may have no legislators on a
subcommittee. 
Presidential Influence
Federal disaster declaration is open to political influences because there are no established
set of criteria the president uses when deciding whether or not to declare a disaster; and the
president has unilateral authority to declare a disaster.  The process of disaster declaration
involves the governor of the affected state contacting the president, with the president making the
final decision as to whether or not a disaster is declared.  The public choice model predicts that
those states politically important to the president are likely to have more disasters declared.  In
fact, an article in the September 1996 issue of The American Spectator summarized several stories
from the nation’s top newspapers documenting that many states who had bonafide disasters were
overlooked while electoral vote-rich states, such as California and Florida, had disasters declared
in the wake of mild natural occurrences.
5   Downton and Pielke (2002) provide evidence of this by
showing that presidential flood declarations are greater in election years where the president is
running for reelection.  9
Willet (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) suggest the political importance of each
state can be measured by its expected number of electoral votes.  We construct a measure, which
we term ‘electoral importance,’ that considers that the president has an greater incentive to
declare more disasters in those states where his chance of reelection is near 50% (i.e. battle-
ground states), compared to states where his chances are greater than or less than 50%. To
compute our measure of electoral importance, we first calculated the percent of presidential
elections from 1956 to 1996 that were won by a Democrat.
6  This percentage was then entered
into a formula that produces a maximum value of one if the percent of elections won is 50%, and
has a value that symmetrically decreases to zero as the percentage of elections won approaches
either 0% or 100%.
7  This value is then multiplied by the number of electoral votes in each state
(from the Federal Registrar) to give us our electoral importance variable.  Thus, if the president
has a 50-50 chance of winning a state, then the electoral importance of that state is equal to the
state’s number of electoral votes, whereas a 0% or 100% chance of winning a state provides an
electoral importance of zero.
State governors often serve as the link between the president and a state’s constituency,
especially in election years.  Governors are often seen beside the president as he tours or
campaigns in the state.  During election years governors of the same political party as a
presidential candidate often publicly offer their endorsement of the candidate.  Governors also
offer public comments on the president’s agenda.  Whether the comments are favorable is surely
dependent upon the political party affiliation of the governor and the president.  Given these
relationships between governors and the president, the public choice model suggests that the
president may declare more disasters in those states whose governor is of the same political party10
as the president.   We include a dummy variable that accounts for this relationship that has a value
of one if the governor from state i in year t is from the same political party as the president, and
has a value of zero otherwise.
Finally, because the Stafford Act allows the president to unilaterally declare a disaster
without the approval of congress, it is possible that the president may use this power to punish or
reward legislators.  A Democratic president may decide not to declare a disaster in a state with
predominately Republican representation in congress, either to punish the legislators for not
supporting his policies or just to hurt the legislators politically, especially in congressional election
years.  In addition, disaster declaration may act as a sort of log-rolling between the president and
congress. The ability of the president to use disaster declaration as a political tool, however, is
tempered by the severity of the disaster and the nationwide attention it receives.  We compute for
each year the percent of legislators from each state in the U.S. Congress that are Republican and
the percent of legislators from each state in the U.S. congress that are Democrats.  For years in
our sample in which George H. Bush was president this congress variable is the percent of
legislators from each state that are Republican, and for Bill Clinton years the congress variable is
the percent of legislators from each state that are Democrat.
Controlling for Disaster Size
Of course, disaster declaration and expenditure levels are directly related to the severity of
an actual disaster besides the possible political influence of oversight committees and the
president.  In order to evaluate the impact of oversight committee membership and presidential
influence on disaster expenditures and declarations, it is important that we control for the size of11
the natural disaster in our empirical models.  We consider two variables that serve as measures for
the size of a disaster.  One variable is the dollar amount of private property insurance claims due
to natural disasters, provided by the American Insurance Services Group, Inc.  This variable is
available by state by year, and is simply the total dollar amount of private property insurance
claims that were filed as a result of a natural disaster.  The second variable is Red Cross financial
disaster assistance, which includes monetary payments to individuals and families along with food,
medicine, etc.   It is expected that the Red Cross financial assistance variable and the private
insurance claims variable are both directly related to the level of FEMA disaster expenditures.
8 
Thus, if we think of total FEMA disaster assistance as having both an altruistic component (based
on the severity of the disaster) and a politically motivated component, by including the Red Cross
and private insurance variables in the regression we can control for the severity component, and
isolate the politically motivated component of FEMA expenditures.
III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
This section presents the two empirical models we use to test for political influence over
disaster declaration and FEMA disaster expenditures.  Recall that the disaster declaration relief
process is that the president decides whether or not to declare the state or region a disaster area
after receiving a request from the governor.  Only after a disaster has been declared by the
president can relief be provided by FEMA.   The first model we present accounts for those
factors, political and otherwise, influencing the rate of disaster declaration by the president. The
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whether states having greater representation on FEMA oversight committees receive higher
FEMA disaster payments.
A Model of Presidential Disaster Declaration
The number of presidential disaster declarations by state by year was provided by FEMA.
Over the period 1991 through 1999, the number of presidential disaster declarations ranged from
98 in Texas to one in Wyoming.  Florida and California had 23 and 16 disasters declared,
respectively.  Most states had between one and 20 disasters declared over the sample period.  To
explore the determinants of presidential disaster declaration, one could, using ordinary least
squares (OLS), regress the number of presidential disasters declared in state i in year t on a vector
explanatory variables, including state electoral importance and the governor dummy variable.
9 
However, the count nature of the dependent variable will render OLS inconsistent, as well as
introduce heteroscedasticity into the model.  The number of disasters declared, like the disaster
expenditure variable, is censored.  Also, the non-zero observations take values of yit =  1, 2, 3,
etc., depending upon the number of disasters the president declared.  To consider the count-
nature of the dependent variable we estimate the disaster declaration model using a Poisson
regression model.
The basic Poisson model (see Greene, 2000) is:
where λit is the average number of occurrences (in this case disasters declared) within the given
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(2) ln λit = βNx  
Given the nonlinear nature of the model, maximum likelihood is the favored estimation
approach.  The likelihood function for (1) can be written, using (2), as:
Estimating (3) will provide coefficient estimates, and finding ME[yit | x]/ Mx provides the marginal
effects.  These measure the impact of each explanatory variable on the mean rate of occurrence
for disaster declaration.
We anticipate the electoral importance variable to be positive, suggesting that the rate of
disaster declaration is higher in those states that are politically important to the president.  If the
president rewards governors of the same political party, then the governor variable should be
positive.  If disaster declaration is used as a tool by the president to politically help legislators of
the same political party (or harm legislators of the opposing political party), a positive relationship
is expected between the congress variable and the rate of disaster declaration.  We also include
per capita income to explore whether relatively wealthier states receive more or less favorable
treatment by the president, along with a set of regional and year dummy variables to control for
unobserved state and time effects. The coefficient estimates for the 1992 and 1996 year dummy
variables are reported to reveal any differences in the mean rate of presidential disaster declaration
during an election year (1991 is the omitted category).
10   In an attempt to control for the actual14
number of disasters in the state that year, we also include the number of disasters declared by
private insurance companies as an independent variable in the regressions.
11
A Model of FEMA Disaster Expenditures
We examine the impact of oversight committee membership on FEMA disaster
expenditures by regressing FEMA disaster expenditures on several subcommittee variables and
other explanatory variables.  The models take the form:
(4) yit* = βNx + eit
yit = 0 if yit*# 0,
yit = yit* if yit* > 0 
Given the censored nature of the dependent variable, performing OLS on equation (4) will
result in inconsistent coefficient estimates. A tobit regression model is used to account for the
censored data and arrive at consistent coefficient estimates.  The tobit coefficients each measure
the impact of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable given that a disaster has been
declared (positive values of yit only).  The marginal effects are each interpreted as the effect of the
explanatory variable on the expected value of the dependent variable, incorporating both their
effect on the probability a disaster is declared and the level of disaster expenditures.  Whether one
is interested in the tobit coefficients or the marginal effects depends upon the question at hand. 
Although we generate both estimates, we are primarily interested in the tobit coefficients.
We generate two oversight subcommittee variables to test whether states having greater
representation on Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act oversight subcommittees receive higher15
FEMA disaster payments.  One variable represents the total number of legislators from state i in
year t that serve on one or more of four the Stafford Act oversight subcommittees (shown in
Table 2).  The other variable represents the total number of legislators from state i in year t that
serve on one or more of the five non-Stafford Act FEMA oversight subcommittees.  For any state
within a given year, subcommittee membership by state ranges from zero to seven for all of the
Stafford Act oversight committees, and ranges from zero to ten for all of the non-Stafford Act
subcommittees.  Membership by state also varies year to year in terms of the number of legislators
on each subcommittee from each state.  Although we expect both subcommittee variables to be
positive and significant, we also expect the Stafford Act oversight subcommittee variable to be
larger than the non-Stafford Act oversight subcommittee variable since the Stafford Act directly
involves disaster relief, the primary function of FEMA.
We then separated the Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act variables to explore any
differences between Senate and House subcommittees.  Senators and representatives face
different median voters.  Also, given that disasters are normally isolated to a small geographic
area, one might expect House members from the impacted district to be more responsive to the
disaster (and thus exert more influence) than a Senator from the same state.  This is because for
most natural disasters, a House member will have a higher percentage of his or her constituency
impacted by the disaster than a Senator from the same state.  The benefit FEMA can provide a
legislator on an oversight committee in terms of increased votes or support is thus higher for
Representatives than it is for Senators.  In this environment, Goff and Grier (1993) suggest that
Senators will be less politically effective and less likely to apply influence relative to House
members.  Furthermore, as noted in the paper’s introduction, it was the House Appropriations16
committee that took action against excessive spending at FEMA.  This suggests that FEMA may
be more responsive to this and possibly other House committees.  
To explore these possible differences between Senate and House subcommittees, we
separated the Stafford act variable into two new variables, one reflecting House subcommittees
overseeing the Stafford Act and the other reflecting Senate subcommittees overseeing the
Stafford Act.  Similarly, we divided the variable for non-Stafford Act oversight subcommittees
into both a Senate variable and a House variable.
Other variables in the disaster expenditure model include private insurance property claims
from natural disasters and Red Cross financial disaster assistance.  These variables control for the
size of the disaster and are expected to be positive.  As in the disaster declaration model, we also
include regional and year dummy variables with the 1992 and 1996 dummy variables reported to
reveal differences in the mean level of disaster expenditures during an election year.  Finally, the
number of FEMA disasters declared is included in the models because the number of disasters
declared is a determinant of the probability that the expenditure variable is non-zero.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Presidential Disaster Declaration
The results from three different Poisson regressions are shown in Table 3.
12   The first
specification only includes the number of private insurance disaster declarations and state
economic variables.  The second specification includes the congress variable and the governor
dummy variable, and the third specification includes the electoral importance variable.  All
specifications contain regional and year dummy variables.
1317
As expected, the private insurance disaster declaration variable is positive and significant
in all three specifications.  Per capita income is significant in the third specification only, providing
slight evidence that states having higher per capita income have a lower rate of disaster
declaration than lower income states, possibly suggesting lower income states are favored over
higher-income states.
We find evidence that certain political incentives facing the president significantly impact
the rate of disaster declaration.  Those state having a higher electoral importance have a higher
rate of presidential disaster declaration.  This finding is consistent with Downton and Pielke’s
(2002) finding that a greater number of floods are declared by the president in election years.  We
also find evidence that the mean rate of presidential disaster declaration was higher during election
years compared to a non-election year (1991).  The mean rate of disaster declaration during an
election year was higher for Bill Clinton than George H. Bush.  The coefficients on the 1996
election year dummy variable are greater in magnitude than all other year dummy variables,
suggesting that the mean rate of disaster declaration in our sample was highest in the year of Bill
Clinton’s reelection campaign.   We find no evidence that those states having a governor of the
same political party as the president have, on average, a higher rate of disaster declaration.  The
insignificant coefficient on the congress variable suggests that disaster declaration in a state is not
influenced by the political party of the state’s legislators, suggesting that the president does not
punish legislators of the opposing political party.
Several results from our disaster declaration regressions support the public choice model
that political agents respond to the incentives they face.  Evidence clearly shows that the rate of
disaster declaration across states is not only a function of disaster occurrence, but is determinant18
on the political benefits that a state can offer to the president.  In the next section we explore
whether political incentives impact the distribution of FEMA disaster expenditures, given that a
disaster has been declared by the president.
FEMA Payments and Congressional Influence
An important issue that arises regarding the estimation of the disaster expenditure models
is the possible endogeneity of the subcommittee variables, thus resulting in possible biased
coefficient estimates.  The question is, are legislators from states having relatively more disasters
more likely to be on a FEMA oversight committee than legislators from less disaster-prone states? 
Weingast and Marshall (1988) provide evidence that, at least to some degree, legislators will
attempt to self-select to those oversight committees that are relevant to their constituents’
interests.  To test for the endogeneity of the committee variables within a tobit framework, we
follow the procedure outlined in Smith and Blundell (1986).  The procedure involves regressing
the committee variables on the explanatory variables in Table 4 (and other identifying variables),
keeping the residuals from these regressions, and including the residuals in the final tobit model.
14 
A Wald test (distributed as χ
2) is then conducted on the null hypothesis that the residual slopes are
jointly equal to zero (no endogeneity).  We computed a Wald statistic for the two models
containing subcommittee variables.  The Wald statistic for the endogeneity test of the two
subcommittee variables shown in model (2) was 4.90, and the Wald statistic was 4.68 for the
endogeneity test of the four committee variables in model (3).  Both Wald statistics are less than
the χ
2 critical values of 5.99 and 9.49, respectively.  The results suggest that the committee
variables are not endogenous.
1519
We regress FEMA disaster expenditures in state i in year t (including the observations
with values of zero) on private insurance disaster payments, Red Cross disaster assistance, the
number of FEMA disasters declared, regional and year dummies, and the oversight subcommittee
variables.
16  The coefficient estimates from the three tobit regressions are shown in Table 4.
17   All
three specifications reveal that private insurance disaster payments and Red Cross disaster
assistance are directly related to FEMA disaster expenditures, as expected. 
We find strong evidence that political incentives are significant determinants of FEMA
disaster relief payments.  The Stafford Act oversight subcommittee variable in model (2) is
positive and significant, revealing that those states having greater representation on FEMA
oversight subcommittees received higher FEMA disaster relief.  This finding and the fact that the
non-Stafford Act oversight variable is not significant supports the greater influence that Stafford
Act subcommittees have on disaster relief compared to non-Stafford Act subcommittees.
Model (3) breaks the Stafford Act and non-Stafford act variables into separate Senate and
House variables.  The evidence supports the hypothesis that FEMA is more likely to be responsive
to House members.  House members have a higher percentage of their constituency impacted by a
disaster than a corresponding Senator, and it was the House Appropriations Committee that
reprimanded FEMA in the past for excessive spending. 
We also find evidence that the average level of disaster expenditures during election year
1996 (Bill Clinton’s reelection year) was significantly greater than during a non-election year -
roughly $140 million higher.  Only 1994 (the year of the Northridge earthquake in California) had
a higher average level of relief than 1996.  The average level of disaster expenditures in 1992
(George H. Bush’s reelection year) was not significantly different than the previous year. 20
The results from model (2) suggest that, on average, states having legislators on a Stafford
Act oversight subcommittee received an additional $26 million in FEMA disaster expenditures for
each legislator on a subcommittee.  Model (3) reveals that states having House members on a
Stafford Act oversight subcommittee received an additional $36.5 million, whereas House
members on non-Stafford Act subcommittees generate $25 million.  The average impact for a
state having a House member on a FEMA oversight committee is roughly $31 million in
additional disaster relief for each House member on a subcommittee.
The tobit coefficients in Table 4 measure the impact of each subcommittee variable on
FEMA disaster payments given that a disaster has been declared.  The marginal effects of each
variable show the impact each variable has on the expected level of FEMA disaster payments,
considering both the impact on the probability of disaster declaration and the level of expenditures
once a disaster has been declared.  The marginal effects from the three regressions in Table 4 are
shown in Table 5.  The marginal effects also provide significant evidence of congressional
influence over the level of FEMA disaster payments, with the results directly supporting those
shown in Table 4.
FEMA Payments - How Much Is Due to Political Influence?
Although we have shown that congressional oversight impacts the level of FEMA disaster
relief in a state, it is interesting to calculate how much of total FEMA disaster relief over our
sample period is motivated politically rather than by disaster severity or frequency.  The predicted
values (for non-zero observations only) from the regressions shown in Table 4 are the predicted
level of total FEMA disaster expenditures given that a disaster has been declared.  The level of21
FEMA disaster payments that are a result of congressional oversight can be computed by
multiplying the significant coefficient estimates from each oversight subcommittee variable by the
actual number of legislators on each type of subcommittee (Stafford or non-Stafford), and then
summing over each significant subcommittee variable.  The ratio of this value to the total level of
FEMA expenditures gives the percent of total FEMA payments that are due to political influence. 
This calculation for model (3) suggests that 44.5% of total FEMA disaster payments are due to
Representative membership on FEMA oversight committees.  Based on our data, sample period
and estimated coefficients, this simulation suggests that nearly half of all FEMA disaster relief is
explained by political influence rather than actual need.
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
In this paper we examined how congressional and presidential influence impacts FEMA
disaster expenditures across the states.  Using state level FEMA disaster expenditure data from
1991 through 1999, we explore whether those states that are politically important to the president
receive higher FEMA disaster expenditures than other states.  We also explore whether FEMA
disaster expenditures are higher in those states having congressional representation on FEMA
oversight subcommittees. 
The process of disaster declaration and funding lends itself well to empirical testing.  After
a disaster strikes a particular area, the governor makes a request to the president for disaster
assistance.  After receiving a governor’s request, the president then decides whether or not to
declare the state or region a disaster area.  If a disaster has been declared by the president,
congress and FEMA then decide upon the appropriate funding amount.  In addition, under the22
Stafford Act the President has the authority to declare a disaster without the approval of
congress.  This fact offers an unique opportunity to explore how the president uses this power.
We find evidence that those states politically important to the president have higher rates
of disaster declaration.  Also, the mean level of disaster declaration is found to be higher in certain
election years compared to non-election years.  We find no evidence that the president uses his
disaster declaration power to politically harm legislators of the opposing political party (or help
legislators of his own party), or that states having a governor who is from the same political party
as the president receive higher levels of disaster relief.  We find strong evidence that once a
disaster is declared, disaster expenditures are higher in those states having congressional
representation on FEMA oversight subcommittees.  Our estimates suggest that for each House
member on an oversight subcommittee (which directly oversees disaster expenditures), states
receive an average of $31 million in excess disaster expenditures for each Representative on a
committee.  Of all FEMA disaster relief provided over the sample period, our models suggest that
nearly half of this total is due to political influences rather than by need.
Although FEMA is often promoted as a savior for individuals and communities hit by a
disaster, we find evidence that disaster declaration and the level of FEMA disaster expenditures
are both politically motivated.  These findings cast doubt on FEMA’s altruistic goal of financial
assistance to those most in need, and questions the role of government versus private agencies in
providing disaster relief.23
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2, where X is the percent of presidential elections 
between 1956 and 1996 won by a Democrat and Y is the weighting factor having a maximum
value of one at X = 50% and a minimum value of zero at X = 0% or X = 100%.  Y is multiplied by
the number of electoral votes in a state to arrive at the measure of electoral importance.  Because
Y has an inverted U-shape, the value of Y is the same if we used the percent of presidential
elections that were won by a Republican.
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8. We discuss the potential simultaneity between FEMA expenditures and the Red Cross and 
private insurance variables later in the paper.
9. It would be of interest to explore what percent of disaster declaration requests by state
governors were honored by the president.  However, the number of disaster declaration requests 
was not available.
10. There are a total of nine regional dummy variables, and a state’s assignment to a particular
region is based on the assignment given by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.  The nine regions are:
New England, Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South
Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific (omitted). 
11. The number of disasters declared by private insurance companies is from the American
Insurance Services Group, Property Claim Services.  According to the industry, a weather event
is considered a natural disaster if total damages in a geographic area exceed $25 million.  This
value has increased over time to reflect increases in building costs.  Insurance payments are based
solely on individuals’ insurance claims and are not influenced by the level of federal disaster relief.
12. One feature of the Poisson model is that it assumes that the mean of the dependent variable is
equal to its variance, or E[yit | x] = Var[yit | x] = λit = e
βNx .  A test of this assumption can be
conducted.  The test, proposed by Cameron and Trivedi (1990), is commonly called a test for
overdispersion.  They essentially test whether the variance of y is equal to its mean, or 
Ho: var[yit] = uit , H1: var[yit] = uit + "·g(uit).  Rejecting Ho ("…0) suggests that the variance is not
equal to the mean.  In this case, a negative binomial regression can be performed.  We performed
the over-dispersion test for our three presidential models.  In each model the coefficient " was not
significant at conventional levels, suggesting the Poisson model is appropriate.28
13. In Texas in 1996 there were 33 disasters declared and in 1998 there were 56 disasters
declared.  For all other observations the number of disasters declared ranged from zero to eight,
with each value between zero and eight having at least one observation (the average number of
disasters in the sample is 1.5).  Effective estimation of the Poisson model requires no large break
in the count sequence of the dependent variable, so these two observations from Texas had to be
omitted to estimate the models.
14. Additional variables must be included in the first stage regression for identification purposes.
The other variables we included in the committee regressions were per capita income, population,
the number of households, and the number of farm acres.
15. The fact that we find committee assignments to be exogenous yet we claim disaster relief is
politically desirable may seem like a contradiction.  The important fact here, however, is that the
subcommittees that oversee FEMA are also responsible for overseeing other functions of
government that would much more heavily drive the desire to be on the committees.  In addition,
because natural disasters are random and uncertain, it seems legislators would not actively seek to
be on disaster oversight committees for the sole purpose of manipulating disaster aid because the
opportunities to take advantage of this assignment are not clear and foreseen in advance. 
However, once a disaster does occur in a committee member’s state, FEMA is in a position to
gain from increasing expenditures above their ‘normal’ levels.
16. It is possible that FEMA expenditures influence the amount of Red Cross expenditures and
private insurance expenditures (i.e. both variables could be endogenous).  Using model (3), we
empirically tested for the endogeneity of Red Cross expenditures and private insurance disaster
expenditures with the same methodology used for committee variables.  The Wald test statistic29
was 0.30 for private insurance expenditures and 0.32 for Red cross expenditures.  Both values are
less than the P
2 critical value of 3.84, suggesting neither variable is endogenous and no
simultaneity exists with FEMA disaster expenditures.  This is interesting in its own right, but we
believe the explanation is that private insurance claims are paid solely on individuals’ insurance
benefits and the level of damage. In addition, the Red Cross provides expenditures on specific
items, such as food, temporary shelter, medicine, etc., that are available immediately after a
disaster strikes, whereas FEMA simply issues checks to impacted individuals several days or
weeks after the disaster.
17. We also included economic and demographic variables in the tobit regressions, such as per
capita income, population, per capita transfer payments, farm and non-farm income, and
retirement payments.  Each of these variables were found to be highly correlated with the private
insurance and red cross variables and were insignificant in each regression specification. 30
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FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency
FTC: Federal Trade Commission
IRS: Internal Revenue Service
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares31
Table 1 
Total FEMA Disaster Expenditures by State - 1991 to 1999  
Top & Bottom Ten States






California $8,871.5 Nevada $38.3
Florida 2,594.0 New Hampshire 30.7
North Carolina 950.3 Connecticut 28.7
Illinois 686.6 Colorado 28.6
Georgia 640.5 Delaware 24.3
North Dakota 590.5 Rhode Island 19.2
Minnesota 510.7 Montana 15.8
Texas 506.2 New Mexico 10.5
New York 502.8 Utah 1.8
Louisiana 426.2 Wyoming 1.1
Notes: Data obtained from FEMA and is converted to real 1996 dollars.32
Table 2 
FEMA Oversight Committees and Average Membership
Stafford Act Oversight Subcommittees
Average Number of
Members 
1991 - 1999 
House of Representatives
Water, Resources & Environment  30




Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety 7
Veterans Administration, Housing and Urban Development, 
and Independent Agency
11
Non-Stafford Act Oversight Subcommittees
House of Representatives
Basic Research  20
Housing and Community Opportunity 28
Senate
Oversight of Government Management and 
District of Columbia
5
Housing Opportunity and Community Development 11
Science, Technology, and Space 9
Notes: Subcommittee membership by state for each legislator is from the Almanac of American Politics.  FEMA
oversight by the above subcommittees was confirmed by the Almanac and FEMA.33
Table 3 
Factors Impacting the Rate of Presidential Disaster Declaration 
POISSON REGRESSIONS - Marginal Effects


































Electoral Importance -------- -------- 0.017**
(2.04)
















Regional and Year Dummy
Variables
Yes Yes Yes
Observations 448 448 448
Log Likelihood -600.21 -599.53 -597.08
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of presidential disasters declared in state i in year t. 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  The
restricted log likelihood for the models (all $’s = 0) is -648.84.  The coefficient on per capita
income is interpreted per a $10,000 change.  All coefficients are interpreted as their impact on
the mean rate of disaster declaration.  1991 is the omitted year dummy variable.  The sample
period is 1991 to 1999.34
Table 4 
Determinants of FEMA Disaster Expenditures - Tobit Coefficients



















































Number of Representatives on
Stafford Act Oversight Committees -------- -------- 36,568,792**
(2.33)
Number of Representatives on Non-
Stafford Act Oversight Committees -------- -------- 24,689,388**
(1.96)












Regional and Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 450 450 450
Log Likelihood -6075.10 -6070.63 -6068.09
Notes: Dependent variable is FEMA disaster expenditures. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at
5%, * at 10%.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.   Each coefficient is interpreted as the impact35
on FEMA expenditures given non-zero (positive) levels of FEMA disaster expenditures. 1991 is
the omitted year dummy variable.  The sample period is 1991 to 1999.36
Table 5 
Determinants of FEMA Disaster Expenditures  - Marginal Effects














































































Regional and Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is FEMA disaster expenditures. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at
5%, * at 10%. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.  Each marginal effect reflects the impact on
the expected amount of disaster expenditures, as each variable impacts the probability of a
disaster being declared and the level of expenditures.  1991 is the omitted year dummy variable. 
The sample period is 1991 to 1999.  Number of observations is 450.37